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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the experience of Latin-America [LATAM] with financial liberalization in the
1990s. The rush towards financial liberalizations in the early 1990s was associated with expectations
that external financing would alleviate the scarcity of saving in LATAM, thereby increasing
investment and growth. Yet, the data and several case studies suggest that the gains from external
financing are overrated. The bottleneck inhibiting economic growth is less the scarcity of saving, and
more the scarcity of good governance. A possible interpretation for these findings is that in countries
where private savings and investments were taxed in an arbitrary and unpredictable way, the
credibility of a new regime could not be assumed or imposed. Instead, credibility must be acquired
as an outcome of a learning process. Consequently, increasing the saving and investment rates tends
to be a time consuming process. This also suggests that greater political instability and polarization
would induce consumers to be more cautious in increasing their saving and investment rates
following a reform. Hence, reaching a sustained take-off in Latin-America is a harder task to
accomplish than in Asia.
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1.    Introduction and summary 
 
  Latin America in the 1990s retained its dubious notoriety as the experimental lab of 
economic policies.  The decade started with renewed optimism about the virtues of market 
oriented liberalization. Old concerns about the sequencing of reforms were replaced with the 
buoyant view that dismantling all the impediments to trade in goods and assets would lead 
LATAM to quick prosperity, overcoming the lost decade of the 1980s.  The resumption of large 
inflows of capital in the early 1990s, the disinflation in Argentina under Menem, and the 
growing trade integration of Mexico as part of NAFTA reinforced the optimism of the early 
1990s.  However, a series of crises starting with the collapse of the Mexican Peso in December 
1994, continuing with the financial instability in Brazil in the mid 1990s, culminating with the 
melt down of the Argentinean currency board, deflated the optimism about the virtues of 
financial liberalizations in Latin America.  The purpose of this paper is to reassess the experience 
of Latin America with financial liberalization, putting it into broader perspective by comparing 
the LATAM experience with that of other developing countries.   
 
The main conclusions of the paper are: 
 
•  The rush to reform in the early 1990s was propagated by the presumption that external 
financing would alleviate the scarcity of saving in developing countries, inducing higher 
investment and higher growth rates.  The 1990s experience with financial liberalization 
suggests that the gains from external financing are overrated.  The data suggest that the 
bottleneck inhibiting economic growth is less the scarcity of saving, and more the 
scarcity of good governance.  Indeed, in the 1990s, countries that relied less on external 
finance, grew faster.  This observation is consistent with several interpretations, yet the 
precise channels explaining these findings need further investigation. 
•  The wave of financial reforms led to deeper diversification, where greater inflows from 
the OECD financed comparable outflows from developing countries, with little effect on 
the availability of resources to finance tangible investment. 
•  The experience of developing countries suggests that increasing the saving and 
investment rates tends to be a time consuming process.  Some of this inertia may be 
consistent with habit formation.    "Habit formation", however, may be observationally   3
equivalent to adaptive learning in the presence of uncertainty – in countries where private 
saving and investment were taxed in an arbitrary and unpredictable way, the credibility of 
a new regime could not be assumed or imposed.  Instead, credibility must be acquired as 
an outcome of a time consuming learning process.  If this interpretation holds, agents in 
countries characterized by greater political instability would be more cautious in 
increasing their saving and investment rates following a reform.  The past high volatility 
of policies in Latin-America would induce the private sector there to impose "stringent" 
tests on reforming policy makers.   
•  The literature on the optimal exchange rate regimes frequently attaches too much 
importance to the choice of monetary policy.  Beyond the short-run, monetary and fiscal 
policies are intertwined via the intertemporal budget constraints.  Indeed, one may argue 
that a deficient fiscal system may lead to crises, independently of the exchange rate 
regime.  Placing too much faith on a fixed exchange rate or on a currency board as the 
mechanism for fiscal discipline overlooks the fact that the cost of changing the exchange 
rate regime (and more generally of monetary policy) is much lower than the cost of a 
fundamental fiscal reform. In these circumstances, the choice of the exchange rate regime 
will impact only on the timing of the ultimate crisis.  Casting the problem in terms of the 
“smart” choice of an exchange rate regime is potentially hazardous, as it obscures the 
need to challenge the deeper fiscal deficiencies.   
•  The view that globalization makes the sequencing of reforms irrelevant is not supported 
by recent experience.  Indeed, the experience suggests that putting the macro house in 
good order is a precondition for successful financial reform.   A cautious strategy starts 
with liberalizing trade and stabilizing the economy before moving towards convertibility, 
as was suggested by the 1980s literature. 
 
Section 2 discusses the landscape of financial liberalizations in LATAM.  Section 3 focuses 
on possible lessons and reviews selectively the large literature propagated by the LATAM 
experience.  Section 4 closes with interpretative remarks.     4
 
2.  Financial liberalizations in the 1990’s: global perspectives on the Latin American 
experience 
The background for the financial liberalization of the 1990s had been the lost decade of 
the 1980s -- stagnation of economic growth and the rise in inflation associated with the 1982-89 
debt crisis.  The political economy changes triggered by the crises put in place new managements 
in the region.  The Brady plan, the resumption of the inflow of capital to LATAM in the early 
1990s, and the fresh start offered by the new managements induced the region to adopt sweeping 
reforms.  Argentina, Brazil and Mexico illustrate the trend: countries opted to follow exchange 
rate based stabilization programs, coupled with deep trade and financial liberalizations, and 
privatization of significant portions of the public sector.  The presumption was that the renewed 
external financing would augment domestic saving, increasing investment and the growth rate.
2 
The magnitude of the financial liberalization in LATAM can be grasped using the index of 
capital mobility reported in Edwards (2004).
3  Normalizing completely free capital mobility at 
100, Edwards reports that the index of capital mobility in LATAM increased from about 40 in 
the 1980s to about 75 in the 1990s.  Throughout that period the index in Asia increased mildly 
from about 40 in the 1980s to 60 prior to the 1997 crisis, dropping to 55 in the aftermath of the 
crisis.  The Middle East and North Africa experienced a much smaller increase throughout that 
time, from about 40 to 50.  According to this index, the financial liberalization in LATAM 
exceeded substantially liberalization in other continents. 
                                                 
2 For example, Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, stated in a keynote 
address in 13/2/98:  
“For emerging markets, the consequence of these trends has been that they have rapidly become 
integrated into international capital markets. This has had a number of advantages. Private debt 
or portfolio inflows in response to economic liberalisation have expanded sizeably, from less 
than $40 billion per year over the period 1983-1990, to an average of about $200 billion a year 
in the last five years. These capital inflows have provided additional resources to supplement 
domestic savings and support high levels of investment.”  
 
3 This index combines the information from Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002) with information from 
country-specific sources.  See Edwards (1995) for a detailed account of the liberalizations in the early 1990s.   5
 
2.1  Financial Liberalization and Investment Financing Sources in LATAM, 1990s 
Figure 1 traces the growth of the GDP per capita of LATAM and other regions in the 
1990s years.  Overall, LATAM’s growth has been significantly below that of Asia, but better 
than that of Africa.  In order to understand the ultimate impact of the financial liberalization I 
rely on a simple diagnostic tool, introduced in Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) – the self-
financing ratio.  Using the WDI data, we construct a self-finance measure, indicating the share of 
tangible capital supported by past national saving.  The ‘ideal’ self-financing would be obtained 


















i t d I d S f , where d  is the deprecation rate of tangible capital,  t t S I ; 
are the gross investment and national saving at time t, in constant PPP, respectively.  A value of 
one of the self-financing ratio would correspond to an economy where the entire stock of 
domestic capital is self-financed.  A self-financing ratio below one indicates some reliance on 
foreign saving --  t f ˆ 1−  is the foreign-financing ratio, measuring the fraction of domestic capital 
that was financed by foreign saving.
4  In practice, the unbounded backward discounting is not 
feasible due to scarcity of data.  This limitation induces us to rely on approximated measures of 
self-financing.  As illustrated in Aizenman et. al. (2004), the approximated self-financing 
measure deviates from the ideal financing measure by second order magnitude.  
Figures 1-2 report the time patterns of the self-financing ratios, and the corresponding 
growth rates, in three blocks of developing countries [Latin America, Asia and Africa].  
Throughout the nineties, Asia exhibits high self-financing ratios and high growth rates (with the 
exception of 1998).  In contrast, Latin America and Africa display low self-financing ratios, and 
relatively low growth rates.  The growth performance of Latin America was more evenly 
distributed throughout the nineties, exhibiting no obvious growth bonus of the drop in the self-
financing ratios.  Interestingly, the drop in the self-financing ratios in Africa through much of the 
1990s was not associated with a sustained growth bonus – the growth rate picked up in the early 
1990s, collapsing in the second half.  Unlike the experience of Africa, the growth drop of Asia in 
                                                 
4 An alternative strategy is to construct self-financing ratios using gross domestic saving instead of national saving 
[the gap between the two is the net current transfers and income from abroad].  This does not affect the main results 
inferred by relying on the self-financing ratio.      6
the aftermath of the 1997-8 crises has been associated with a remarkable increase of the self-
financing ratios, pushing it well above one, and with the resumption of robust growth. 
Further insight explaining the diverse experience of countries is gained by econometric 
analysis.  Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) examine the association between real per capita 
GDP growth and the self-financing ratios in the 1990s.  We find that higher self-financing ratios 
(implying higher self-financing of a given investment) are associated with a significant increase 
in growth rates, and this effect is convex.   The econometric results show also that better 
institutions are associated with less volatile self-financing ratios, and with a higher growth rate.
5  
In a cross-country GDP per capita growth regression, controlling for the level and volatility of 
self-financing rations, and the quality of institutions, we found that the quality of institutions 
variable “soaks up” the explanatory power from the volatility of self-financing ratios, rendering 
it insignificant, but leaving intact the positive convex effect of self-financing ratios on real per 
capita GDP growth.
6  The results are not driven by any obvious regional patterns: Adding 
regional dummies [Asia, Africa and Latin America] to the regression leads to results that are in 
line with expectations. Africa is growing significantly slower, while all key variables retain 
previous sign and significance.  Notably the correlation between the change in de-facto financial 
openness between 1980s and 1990s and the change in the self-financing ratio between 1991 
(result of accumulation in decade of 1980s) and 2001 (accumulation in 1990s) is, for all practical 
purposes, zero.  Also, while the financial opening was substantial - the average and median 
increases in financial openness were 65%, and 30%, respectively - changes in the self-financing 
rates were insignificant.    
Figure 3 traces the experience of selected Latin American countries.  Figure 3.A focuses 
on Brazil, a country that experienced a rapid decline in the self-financing ratio, starting from a 
lower initial level.  Characteristically, the country failed to benefit from any associated “growth 
bonus”. This is a pattern common to the “average” Latin American country [see Figures 1 and 2].  
                                                 
5 The quality of institutions was calculated as the average of measures of law and order, corruption and bureaucracy 
quality from the International Country Risk Guide (2004). The data on trade openness – measured by [exports + 
imports]/GDP and financial openness--measured by [inflows + outflows of capital]/GDP--are from Frankel and Wei 
(2004).  
6 We also attempted to control for other variables that are used frequently in growth regressions [like the initial GDP 
per capita, etc.], but these controls were insignificant.     7
Another typical case is Bolivia, depicted in Figure 3.D, a country that is characterized by 
exceptionally low levels of self-financing, but also mediocre growth performance.  Figures 3.B 
and 3.C report the dramatic experience of Argentina and Mexico: both experienced serious 
financial crises and associated “sudden stops” in external financing. Both experiences are 
characterized by a reversal of declining self-financing ratios around the time of the crisis 
episode. The financial opening of the 1990s in Argentina is associated with a sizable drop in the 
self-financing ratio, from about 0.92 to 0.88.  This drop ends with the sudden stop, which led to a 
partial reversal of the earlier decline.  As in other countries, the ability to finance a growing share 
of the domestic capital by foreign saving is not associated with any “growth bonus.”  In fact, 
Mexico exhibits a crisis-triggered reversal in its declining self-financing ratio, with economic 
growth that is on average stronger during the time the self-financing ratio increased.  Such a 
reversal was found to be common to other countries experiencing sudden stop, and it may reflect 
both the precautionary and the forced increase in saving, as well as a drop in investment.  In 
some circumstances, this decline in investment may be a welcome development, as would be the 
case in countries characterized by excessive investment prior to the crisis [see Krugman (2000)].  
These results suggest that political economy factors and political risk diversification are 
important in understanding the association between the self-financing ratios and growth.
7   
Figure 3.E provides the experience of the best performer in Latin America – Chile.  Its 
impressive average growth rate of the GDP per capita, exceeding 4%, was almost entirely self-
financed [Chile’s average self-financing throughout that period was = 0.95].   Chile’s experience 
turned out to be common: countries characterized by higher self-financing ratios in the 1990s 
experienced, on average, higher growth rates.  Yet, there are several examples of countries that 
experienced large increases in self-financing ratios with no detectable growth bonus.  Figure 3.F 
reports the experience of Ecuador -- the self-financing ratio increased substantially in the 1990s, 
at a time when the growth rate was almost flat.
  Thus, there is no guarantee that a rising self-
                                                 
7 For example, for countries characterized by economic and political uncertainty, the opening of financial markets 
would lead domestic agents to put a greater share of their savings in offshore accounts, and in certain cases may lead 
foreign consumers to purchase domestic assets, betting on the prospect of improvement in domestic conditions.  
This may lead to large gross flows of capital, with little change in net flows [see Dooley (1988)].    8
financing ratio will produce faster growth.
8  Economic growth depends on all the factors that 
explain the magnitude and the quality of investment in all types of capital.  For most developing 
countries, the obstacles preventing higher growth are not the degree of financial integration, but 
other more basic structural obstacles. 
 
2.2  Possible interpretations and case studies 
There are several possible channels that may rationalize the positive association between 
self-financing and growth.  For example, a take-off triggered by relaxing the state’s restrictions 
on private investment and private saving would increase both S and I over time, with little impact 
on the need to borrow externally, as apparently has been the case in China and India.
9   Such 
growth patterns are consistent with the habit-formation hypothesis [see Carroll et. al. (2000)].
10  
Another possibility is that agents in various countries react to different exposure to financial risk 
differently. The desire to diversify these risks may lead to two-way capital flows, with little 
change in net positions [see Dooley (1988)].   
Further perspectives on these issues can be gained by focusing on the experience of 
Chile, the only country in LATAM that experienced a sustainable take-off in the 1990s.  Figure 4 
traces the self-financing and growth experience of Chile, 1984-2002.  Recalling that in the early 
1980s Chile went through a massive financial crisis and depression, 1984-1992 may be viewed 
as the recovery and take-off period, when growth accelerated rapidly.  This period is also the 
time that the self-financing ratio increased from a low of 0.75 in 1984, to 0.96 in 1992.  This 
                                                 
8 For example, if a country has unsustainable public debt dynamics and cuts back fiscal spending (including public 
investment), then this will tend to raise national savings relative to investment, raising the self-financing ratio at the 
margin; but possibly with a growth slowdown because of the necessary reduction in aggregate demand.  
9 This pattern is consistent with the notion that higher growth increases the saving rate overtime [see Edwards 
(1996), who concludes that the rate of output growth has a significant, positive effect on saving].  
10 The habit formation hypothesis states that people get utility from a comparison of their current level of 
consumption to the level that they are “accustomed to,” the latter corresponds to the habitual level of consumption, 
as defined by consumption history.   Habits make consumers reluctant to change consumption drastically following 
fundamental shocks, slowing the adjustment of consumption.   Habit formation implies that the consumer is more 
willing to postpone consumption in response to an increase in productivity, and thus make the saving response to a 
surge in productivity stronger. 
   9
adjustment is consistent with the habit formation interpretation.  The data also suggest that 
greater confidence in the performance of the economy increases the willingness of domestic 
agents to engage in deeper self-financing – it raises domestic saving at rates that surpass the 
increase in domestic investment.  This is in contrast to the performance of the Argentinean 
economy – despite the stabilization of the early 1990s, the self-financing ratio there remained 
around 0.9, dropping below 0.9 in the second half of the 1990s.  Arguably, this suggests a test for 
the effectiveness of stabilizations -- the degree to which it leads to higher self-financing.  A 
stabilization that fails in increasing the self-financing ratio frequently implies that it does not 
pass the confidence test of the most exposed agents: the residents of the country undergoing the 
policy change.  Using this perspective, the Argentinean stabilization did not fail due to the 
reluctance of foreign investors to invest there [which indeed was not the case], but due to the 
regime’s inability to convince residents of Argentina regarding its staying power.  A possible 
interpretation of the collapse of Argentina’s currency board is that it is much easier to fix the 
exchange rate than to deal with fundamental fiscal imbalances in a weak federal system.  
Skeptical Argentinean residents preferred to hedge their bets by increasing their off-shore saving.  
This diversification was conveniently financed by the inflow of capital following the reform, 
leading to deeper diversification of risk, with little impact on the self-financing ratio.   The next 
section will discuss several alternative interpretations and lessons from the Argentinean 
experience. 
  To gain further insight regarding this matter, it is illuminating to contrast the experience 
of Korea with that of Chile.  At first sight, Korea is viewed as an “Asian Tiger,” whose 
performance is in sharp contrast to LATAM countries.  Yet, closer scrutiny reveals that Korea's 
saving patterns before the mid seventies resembled the experience of LATAM, and that Korea's 
overall performance resembled that of a typical LATAM country prior to "taking off."  
Furthermore, one can identify distinct policies and changes in the incentive structure in Korea 
that preceded the taking-off.
11  Chile represents a Latin American example of a country that, 
following the adaptation of bold reforms, improved its overall growth, and has undergone a 
transition that resembles the earlier stages of development in Korea.  Comparing the two 
countries, one finds that there is a remarkable similarity between the saving and growth patterns 
of Chile and Korea around the take-off period.  These observations are consistent with the notion 
                                                 
11 For a review and interpretation of these policies see Rodrik (1994), Noland (2004), and the references therein.   10
that the saving and growth gap between LATAM and “Asian Tigers” may be rooted in different 
incentive structures and economic circumstances.  Once Chile adopted the proper incentives and 
policies, and once the private sector in Chile gained confidence regarding the durability of these 
measures, Chile embarked on a growth and saving path that resembles that of an Asian tiger.  
Yet, it is premature to speculate if Chile will reach the next stage in the experience of Korea, 
where the take-off has been associated with export oriented growth, climbing the technology 
ladder over time.   
  It is important to note the striking difference between the two countries in the degree of 
stability.  This is manifested in all macroeconomic measures, including the saving rate.  The 
persistence of the saving rate is much greater for Korea, while the volatility of the saving 
"shocks" is much greater for Chile.  The standard error of the 'unanticipated' saving shock in 
Chile is more than twice that of Korea.
12  Figure 6 reports the actual and predicted saving rate in 
the two countries, illustrating the greater volatility of saving rates in Chile.  These results are 
consistent with the interpretation that a key difference between the Latin American and Asian 
tigers experiences is the volatility of the overall economic environment [see Hausmann and 
Gavin (1995)].   
  The experience of developing countries suggests that increasing saving rates would not 
occur overnight, and it may be a time consuming process.  In an important study Carroll and 
Weil (1994) illustrated that the saving rates of East Asian countries (like Korea, Japan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong) were much lower several decades ago, and their thriftiness is a more recent 
phenomenon.  They pointed out that the "statistical" causality may run from a higher growth rate 
to a higher saving rate; and conjectured that the growth-saving causality may be explained in a 
model where utility depends both on present and past consumption, i.e. habit formation [see also 
Carroll et. al. (2000)].    "Habit formation", however, may be observationally equivalent to 
adaptive learning in the presence of uncertainty – in countries where private savings were taxed 
                                                 
12 For the years 1965-1991, the AR(1) representation of the saving rates for the two countries are: 
Chile:   




Korea:   
st = 3.24 + .91st−1; R 2 = 0.908; σ = 2.48
(2.19) (15.8)
.     11
in an arbitrary and unpredictable way, the credibility of a new regime could not be assumed or 
imposed.  Instead, credibility must be acquired as an outcome of a time consuming learning 
process.  In these circumstances, a higher growth rate may be viewed as a signal used in this 
learning process.
13    
  If this interpretation holds, agents in countries characterized by greater political 
instability would be more cautious in increasing their saving and investment rates following a 
reform.  Hence, increasing saving and investment rates in Latin America may be much harder 
than increasing these rates in Asia, explaining LATAM’s relatively low growth rate.
14  The past 
volatility of policies was much greater in Latin America, implying that the private sector there 
would impose more "stringent" tests on the reforming policy maker.  While this behavior may be 
fully justified from the point of view of the private sector, it implies that financing the first stage 
of a "take-off" is a more challenging task.  This gives an advantage to strategies like 
privatization, elimination of burdensome regulations and opening the economy to international 
trade.
15  In these circumstances the first stages of the "taking-off" would be the outcome of 
improving incentives via reforms.   
  A comprehensive study of saving can be found in Edwards (1996), who identified several 
important regularities.
16  The evidence on the private saving reveals four results.  First, similar to 
Caroll and Weil (1994), the private saving rate increases with the rate of growth.  Second, as 
                                                 
13 Frequently the effectiveness of a new administration and its commitment to growth oriented policies is unknown.  
In these circumstances the private sector will update its prior regarding the competence of the administration and the 
saving rate according to various signals (like the duration of a reform, inflation, public debt, etc.).  As these signals 
are positively correlated with the realized growth, growth "explains" saving. 
14 Various studies pointed out that policy uncertainty and political instability reduce private investment and growth 
[see Edwards (1992), Aizenman and Marion (1993) and Ramey and Ramey (1995)].  
15 This point is further strengthened if the allocative efficiency of public investment is smaller than of private 
investment.  This would be the case if public investment leads to inefficient public projects as a means of 
transferring income, reflecting rent seeking activities, political patronage, etc.  In these circumstances the marginal 
productivity of private investment would exceed that of public investment.  Hence, a cross countries comparison of 
aggregate saving is providing only partial information regarding the net resources available for investment.   
Ultimately, both the size and the composition of private versus public saving and investment would determine 
capital accumulation. 
16 He focused on a cross-country study of 50 countries, for the period of 1983-92, disaggregating between private 
and public saving.   12
predicted by Modigliani's life cycle hypothesis, a higher dependency ratio depresses saving.  
Third, deeper financial systems tend to increase the private saving rate.  Fourth, higher 
government saving reduces private saving, but the offset coefficient is significantly less than one, 
implying that the net effect of higher government saving is to increase aggregate saving.
17  
Finally, a deeper government financed social security system reduces private saving, in line with 
Feldstein (1980).   The evidence on public saving reveals that political instability reduces it, 
while growth tends to increase it.  Capital inflows tend to reduce public saving, but the offset 
coefficient is less than one.   
  These results suggest that steps that would increase public saving, increase the funding of 
social security (like the privatization in Chile), and deepen the capital market would increase the 
overall saving rate.  Reforms that improve incentives and increase the stability of the economy 
would further increase the saving rate, as the resultant growth would increase thriftiness over 
time.     
 
3.  Financial liberalization: lessons and policy debates  
 
The financial liberalizations of the 1990s validated empirically the assertion ‘Good-bye 
financial repression, hello financial crash.’ (Diaz-Alejandro (1985)).  Yet, some economists 
found tenuous evidence that financial liberalization tends to increase growth over time.  Both 
observations suggest an intertemporal trade-off.  In the short-run, the fragility induced by 
financial opening frequently leads to crises.   Yet, if these crises would force the country to deal 
with its structural deficiencies, financial opening may induce a higher growth rate in the long-
run.  For example, it remains hard to gauge if Korea would have been better off by refraining 
from financial opening in the early nineties, or if Chile would have benefited by retaining 
financial repression in the eighties-nineties.
18  The answers to these questions depend crucially 
                                                 
17 This result was obtained by Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) for a sample of thirteen countries.  They also 
found that increasing public saving through expenditure reduction is more effective than increasing taxation.  This 
finding has bearing on the Ricardian equivalence, which suggests that government saving fully offsets private 
saving.  The above results imply that the Ricardain hypothesis does not hold, as one may expect in distorted 
economies characterized by political uncertainties. 
18 Obviously, the financial crisis in 1997 adversely impacted Korea’s welfare.  One may argue, however, that it 
prevented a much deeper and longer calamity, akin to Japan’s recession in the 1990s.  Arguably, had Korea   13
on the time horizon of the analysis, as well as on the evaluation of what is the relevant 
counterfactual, both issues to which there are no satisfactory answers.
19    
 
3.1   Financial and trade opening – cost benefits and sequencing  
  A useful survey of financial liberalization is Williamson and Mahar (1998), who focused 
on 34 countries that undertook financial liberalization between 1973-1996.  Overall, they found a 
mixed record of financial liberalization -- The gains are there, but the liberalization carries the 
risk of leading to financial crisis.  Financial liberalization has yielded greater financial depth, and 
increased efficiency in the allocation of investment.  Yet, it has not brought a boost in saving.  
The drawback in the liberalization process is the danger that the liberalization will lead to a 
financial crisis.  For the majority of countries, capital account liberalization increases the 
probability this occurs.  The challenge is to design a liberalization program that does not bring a 
financial crisis in its wake.  The main recommendations emerging from their study are akin to 
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) -- start with macroeconomic stabilization, improve bank 
supervision, while delaying capital-account convertibility till the end of the process.  In the 
transition, "mild financial repression," in the form of a ceiling on deposit interest rates, may be 
advantageous.  This follows from the observation that exceedingly high interest rates encourage 
risk taking by borrowers – moral hazard induced by self-selection.  Banks in stress may wish to 
‘gamble for resurrection’ by lending to such borrowers, at a cost to the taxpayer.  Williamson 
and Mahar conclude that maintaining high spreads may be needed in a transition until banks are 
                                                                                                                                                             
continued with financial repression, a Japanese type of a correction would have hit Korea later.  Korea’s 
development path resembles that of Japan -- its domestic banks accumulated over time large non-performing loans.  
These loans were the heritage of the earlier development strategy, where large corporations had selective access to 
preferential lines of credit.  According to this argument, the crisis of 1997 prevented a larger buildup of these loans, 
saving Korea from a much deeper correction.  Obviously, it is hard to provide a sound test of this argument.  Similar 
ambiguities apply to Chile, which has been the best performing Latin American country in recent years, and is 
credited with a sound banking system.  Yet, Chile experienced a massive banking crisis in the eighties, following 
earlier financial opening.  Arguably, one may credit the superior recent performance of Chile to the painful earlier 
reforms, reforms that were triggered by the crises of the early eighties.   
19 A welfare evaluation of these issues may depend on the degree to which there are political economy trade-offs 
between a large crisis versus a series of smaller crises – a large crisis may be needed to overcome entrenched 
opposing interest groups, yet it may lead to larger welfare costs.     14
able to work off the legacy of bad debt inherited from the period of financial repression.  In such 
an environment, free entry of foreign banks may be a mixed blessing.  The efficiency gains 
should be balanced against the threat of 'gamble for resurrection' by older domestic banks losing 
their franchise value. Imposing higher capital requirements increases the cost of a 'gamble for 
resurrection' strategy.  In these circumstances, deposit rate controls may complement capital 
requirements.  
The overall effect of financial opening on growth remains debatable.  Levine (1997) 
found a positive association, whereas Rodrik (1998) failed to detect any positive effects of 
financial opening on investment, growth and inflation.  While Levine’s interpretation attaches 
the direction of causality from financial deepening to growth, the old dictum that correlations do 
not indicate causality remains valid.   Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) evaluated the empirical 
links between the level of financial intermediary development and economic growth, TFP 
growth, physical capital accumulation, and private savings rates.  The main findings are that 
financial intermediaries exert a large, positive impact on total factor productivity growth, which 
feeds through to overall GDP growth.  Yet, the long-run links between financial intermediary 
development and both physical capital growth and private savings rates are tenuous.  Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundblad (2001) found that equity market liberalizations, on average, lead to a one 
percent increase in annual real economic growth over a five-year period. The investment/GDP 
ratio increases post liberalization, with the investment partially financed by foreign capital, 
inducing worsened trade balances. The liberalization effect is enhanced by a large secondary 
school enrollment, a small government sector and an Anglo-Saxon legal system.
20  
Rodrik’s earlier methodology has been revisited by Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz 
(2001). While they found indications of a positive association between capital account 
liberalization and growth, the effects vary with time, with how capital account liberalization is 
measured, and with how the relationship is estimated.  The evidence, that the effects of capital 
account liberalization are stronger in high-income countries, is fragile. There is some evidence 
that the positive growth effects of liberalization are stronger in countries with strong institutions.  
Capital account liberalization appears to have positive effects on growth only in countries that 
                                                 
20 As is frequently the case with empirical studies relying on macro data, endogeneity and reverse causality remain a 
valid concern in interpreting some of these results.   
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have already opened more generally, hence sequencing matters. But there are significant 
prerequisites for opening, including a reduction of trade barriers and an ability to eliminate 
macroeconomic imbalances.  These conclusions are akin to Edwards (2001) who reported that, 
after controlling for other variables (including aggregate investment), countries with a more open 
capital account have outperformed countries that have restricted capital mobility. There is also 
evidence that an open capital account affects growth positively only after a country has achieved 
a certain degree of economic development. This provides support to the view that there is an 
optimal sequencing for capital account liberalization. 
 
3.2  On the gains from FDI 
Our earlier discussion focused on the patterns of external financing in LATAM, relying 
on a Macroeconomic perspective.  Similar questions can be explored at a more disaggregated 
level, focusing on more disaggregated patterns of external financing, especially FDI.  The rush to 
reform and the growing importance of manufacturing led to optimistic assessments of the gains 
from FDI inflows.  This is vividly reflected in the tendency of developing countries to subsidize 
multinationals investment by means of tax breaks, land grants, etc.  While the debate about the 
gains from FDI is not over, the recent literature is consistent with the notion that gains from FDI 
were overrated.  Attempts to identify positive spillover from FDI to domestic productivity led to 
mixed outcomes, and frequently the effects were found to be small or insignificant.  For 
example, Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) calculated wage spillovers from FDI in Mexico 
and Venezuela.  In Mexico, wages in domestically-owned plants appeared to be lower where 
foreign ownership was high, but the coefficients were not statistically significant.  In Venezuela, 
there seemed to be a significant negative influence of foreign presence on wages in domestically-
owned plants.  These results could reflect a reallocation of the better labor force to foreign plants, 
or the acquisition of higher paying plants by foreigners.   Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that 
increases in foreign equity participation were correlated with increases in productivity for small 
plants, but that increases in foreign ownership in an industry negatively affected productivity in 
domestically-owned plants in the same industry.  The positive effects within the foreign plants 
exceeded the negative effects, but only slightly [see Lipsey (2002)] for a review of the literature]. 
Hanson (2001) pointed out that “While multinationals are attracted to high-productivity 
countries, and to high-productivity industries within these countries, there is little evidence at the   16
plant level that FDI raises the productivity of domestic enterprises. Indeed, it appears that plants 
in industries with a larger multinational presence enjoy lower rates of productivity growth… 
Empirical research thus provides little support for the idea that promoting FDI is warranted on 
welfare grounds.”  Indeed, the experience of Brazil suggests that competition among states for 
FDI may be welfare reducing.  This is in contrast with the experience of Costa Rica, attracting 
Intel and other multinational by its good infrastructure and stable business environment, without 
providing special concessions to multinationals.   
 
3.3   Fiscal, monetary and structural reforms  
  Crises are frequently the delayed manifestations of political economy factors.  Reforms 
that ignore these factors run the risk of inducing too optimistic an assessment of countries, 
leading over time to a large exposure, and ultimately to greater vulnerability.  The literature on 
optimal exchange rate regimes frequently attaches too much importance to the choice of 
monetary policy.  Beyond the short-run, monetary and fiscal policies are intertwined via the 
intertemporal budget constraints [see Aizenman, Kletzer and Pinto (2004)].  Indeed, one may 
argue that a deficient fiscal system may lead to crises independently of the exchange rate regime.  
In these circumstances, the choice of the exchange rate regime will impact only the timing of the 
ultimate crisis.  After all, sovereign risk and exchange rate risks have different causes.  Casting 
the problem in terms of the “smart” choice of an exchange rate regime is potentially hazardous, 
as it obscures the need to challenge the deeper fiscal deficiencies [see Calvo and Mishkin (2003) 
for related analysis].   
These considerations are illustrated in contrasting the policies undertaken by Brazil and 
Argentina in the last 15 years.  During the eighties, both countries were characterized by similar 
fiscal deficiencies, stemming from their organization as loose federal systems. The provincial 
states and municipalities had significant bargaining power relative to the federal centers.  In the 
early nineties, both countries went through successful exchange rate based stabilizations.  The 
nominal anchor provided by pegging the exchange rate, supported rapid disinflation in both 
countries.  Argentina, however, put a much greater emphasis on the importance of a peg – it 
adopted a rigid currency board.  In contrast, Brazil put greater emphasis on dealing with its fiscal   17
imbalances, reducing thereby the relative power of the provincial states.
21  In addition, Brazil 
moved, over time, from a fixed exchange rate regime towards discretionary exchange rate 
management, accommodating external adverse shocks with occasional depreciations.  As recent 
events have painfully illustrated, Brazil’s choice allowed it to steer away from a deep crisis, 
whereas Argentina’s choice has led over time to increased vulnerability, and to the ultimate 
recent crisis.   
One possible justification for “bailing out” countries is the presence of multiple 
equilibria.  Exposure to multiple equilibria is a by-product of the maturity transformation 
accomplished by financial intermediation, where short term deposits are used to finance longer 
term real projects [see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for a banking model, and Chang and Velasco 
(1999) for an open economy model of bank and currency runs].  In these circumstances, the 
presence of the lender of last resort is supposed to prevent the bad equilibrium. As Rogoff (1999) 
discussed, a lender of last resort comes with a hefty cost to the taxpayer.  Some may view the 
fate of Argentina as an example of a country suffering from the adverse consequences of a 
switch to a bad equilibrium.  Supporters of this view point out that conventional measures 
(current account, fiscal deficits, etc.) failed to flag Argentina as a highly vulnerable country in 
the 1990’s.  Indeed, Argentina’s fiscal measures were comparable to those of ‘respected’ OECD 
countries.   Can we infer from this that a lender of last resort would have prevented the 
Argentinean crisis? 
While it is hard to test this assertion, there are fundamental challenges facing the multiple 
equilibria argument.  Vulnerability to a crisis may depend on the flexibility of an economy to 
adjust to changing circumstances.  This includes the ability of the fiscal system and the labor 
market to adjust to unforeseen events.  More generally, country risk may be determined by the 
interaction between shocks, and the quality of the institutions of conflict management [see 
Rodrik (1999)].  In the context of Argentina, the multiple equilibria interpretation is challenged 
by the view that Argentina is a quasi European style welfare state, standing on the shoulders of a 
very thin tax base.  This situation is further exacerbated by the provincial states’ bias towards 
overspending.  Hence, one may conclude that there are fundamental reasons to view Argentina as 
                                                 
21 While it’s premature to conclude that Brazil has accomplished all the adjustments called for under the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 2001, it started the painful process of curbing the biases towards provincial overspending.  See 
Dillinger and Webb (1999) for further details about the reforms.   18
a risky destination for global capital, even if its fiscal deficits and current account deficits are 
comparable to OECD countries.  
The insistence of the Argentinean authorities on preserving the currency board despite the 
growing strength of the dollar in the 1990s, and the occasional real depreciations of Brazil, may 
be viewed as a manifestation of these risks -- viewing the currency board as the main safeguard 
against inflation runs the hazard of providing a signal that deeper fiscal problems are still there.   
Placing too much faith on the currency board as the mechanism for fiscal discipline overlooks 
the fact that the cost of changing the exchange rate regime (and more generally of monetary 
policy) is much lower than the cost of a fundamental fiscal reform.  Hence, a country like 
Argentina runs the risk of being viewed as fiscally unstable, independent of the realized path of 
current account and fiscal deficits.  In the long run, according to this view, the fiscal side will 
determine the strength of the system.  Short of resolving fiscal deficiencies, a country like 
Argentina will find it hard to convince the market that it is a prudent destination for capital. 
One may rephrase the above discussion in terms of the rules versus discretion literature, 
where there are gains from delegating monetary policy to a conservative agent.  As was 
illustrated in Rogoff’s (1985) seminal work, the optimal commitment to the conservative course 
depends on the stochastic structure.  If the balance of shocks tilts over time towards adverse real 
shocks, a less conservative course is preferable.  The success of Brazil and the failure of 
Argentina may be viewed as a vivid example of this principle.  The success of the structural 
reform would also require challenging the fiscal deficiencies that determine, in the long run, the 
course of monetary policy.  Hence, the relative success of Brazil is attributed to its success in 
curbing the bias towards provincial overspending, and to the more appropriate use of 
discretionary exchange rate and monetary policy. 
One may argue that luck [or the absence of it] plays a key role in determining the 
outcome of policies.  Accordingly, the Argentina currency board would have passed the test of 
time if the recent weakening of the dollar and the commodity boom had started in the mid 1990s.  
While this assertion has its own logic, it points out the fallacy of the currency board strategy, and 
confirms the insight of Rogoff’s (1985) – Argentina’s currency board policy gambled on the 
success of Argentina’s macro stance on exogenous factors, without paying attention to exit 
strategies needed to deal with the downside risk associated with adverse external developments.  
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3.4       Alternative perspectives: Original Sin, Debt Intolerance and Currency Mismatch 
We close this section with a review of alternative perspectives about the challenges 
facing LATAM and other developing countries.  The view articulated in Section 2 argued that 
the gains from external finance are overrated, and that in the 1990s countries that relied less 
heavily on external borrowing performed, on average, better.  This interpretation is consistent 
with the earlier literature cautioning about developing countries tendency to over borrow,
22 and 
with the skeptical assessment of the growth and the welfare benefits attributed to financial 
liberalizations.
23  
Alternative perspectives are offered by the Original Sin approach [see Eichengreen, 
Hausmann, and Ugo (2003)].  This approach focuses on the structure of global portfolios and 
international financial markets, arguing that the inability to borrow externally in domestic 
currency inhibits the performance of developing countries, inducing large welfare costs, and 
explaining the difficulty developing countries have in servicing debts.  The authors point out that 
the Original Sin approach differs from Currency Mismatches: an approach that explains exposure 
to crises due to differences in the values of the foreign currency denominated assets and 
liabilities on the balance sheets of the economy as a whole.
24  By definition, Original Sin implies 
a gross foreign debt denominated in foreign currency.  But the country may or may not also incur 
a currency mismatch, depending on how the authorities respond to the act of borrowing.   
In contrast, the Debt Intolerance view [Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003)] argues 
that institutional weaknesses of emerging-market economies lead to weak and unreliable 
policies.  Debt Intolerance is reflected in the EM’s inability to manage levels of external debt 
that are manageable for OECD.  Credit ratings fall more rapidly with debt in emerging markets 
than in advanced countries, as if the former have less debt management capacity.  Possible 
interpretations of Debt Intolerance include institutional weaknesses of emerging-market 
                                                 
22 See McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) on overborrowing due to moral hazard 
and euphoric expectations, leading to crises. Overborrowing may also occur due to congestion externalities, where 
atomistic agents do not internalize the full effects of marginal borrowing on future welfare [Aizenman (1989)].  
Overborrowing due to free rider problems in economies short of international collateral, generated by imperfections 
of the domestic capital market is the focus of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001).  
23 See Kohn and Marion (1991), Rodrik (1998), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2004).   20
economies which lead to weak and unreliable policies. Countries’ histories have bequeathed a 
situation where they find it difficult to run strong policies.   
The focus on external borrowing by the Original Sin school is motivated by the 
observation that, in the absence of other distortions, world welfare would be enhanced if capital 
flowed from capital-rich advanced countries to their more capital-poor emerging market 
counterparts.  Had Original Sin been the only distortion, than removing it would have been 
welfare improving.  Yet, in practice, developing counties are struggling with a large number of 
distortions.  Hence, the welfare effect of removing one distortion is ambiguous.  Specifically, if 
removing the Original Sin would increase the volume of other distorted activities, it may be 
welfare reducing.  
While the Original Sin, Debt Intolerance and Currency Mismatch views offer different 
perspectives, in practice it is hard to design a “horse race” that will provide a clear ranking of the 
importance of the various approaches.  Short of conducting controlled experiments, available 
empirical procedures have limited power in identifying the independent role of the various 
alternatives.  This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that Original Sin measures of most 
developing countries are practically the same.  This suggests a censoring problem.  In addition, 
theory predicts a non linear interaction between the various approaches.   It may be hard to pick 
up such non linearity in a log linear model, especially if one is not testing a tightly specified 
model. 
Alternative reasoning may focus on case study methodology.  A possible clue to the 
issues at hand is that there is very little variation in Original Sin measures across countries, yet 
there is large variation in performance.  This observation suggests that countries may take off 
without solving Original Sin and without solving “institutional weaknesses.”   Such a take-off 
may be accomplished by relaxing the grip of the state on the private sector, encouraging, instead 
of penalizing, entrepreneurship [as apparently has been the case of China, India, etc.].  Hence, 
prolonged growth acceleration may happen without dealing with constraints imposed by the 
Original Sin, or the constraints imposed by existing institutions.   
Another example of the contrast between the various approaches is the comparison of the 
economic records of Chile and Australia.  Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Ugo (2003) argued that 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 See Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) and Goldstein and Turner (2003) for discussion of the economic impact 
of balance sheets effects and currency mismatches.   21
Chile’s performance resembled that of LATAM and not that of Australia due to Original Sin 
considerations. Chile is a favorite example of a country with increasingly strong institutions and 
policies.  Standard institution strengthening measures have not impacted the capacity to borrow 
abroad in an EM’s own currency, over policy-relevant horizons.  The Original sin approach 
views this inability as a key shortcoming explaining the problems facing emerging markets.  An 
alternative interpretation is provided by Caballero et. al. (2004), who contrasted country-trust 
versus currency-trust.  They argue that the lack of country-trust is a more fundamental and 
serious problem behind sudden stops.  They point out that Chile needs external insurance more 
than Australia does, precisely because its ToT shocks are amplified by the resulting contraction 
in the supply of external funds.  So Original Sin is a greater problem for Chile than for Australia.   
“But importantly, Original Sin is not the primitive problem behind the need for substantial 
insurance; the problem is a lack of country-trust.”  This is vividly illustrated by the observation 
that Australia’s inflation has been 4% since federation [about 102 years ago], exceeding 20% in 
only 1 year.  In contrast, Chile’s inflation exceeded 20% in approximately half the years during 
that period.  Australia has a long history with no default by the Federal or State governments.  
Australia’s trust was generated by experiencing several substantial negative external shocks 
without defaulting, unlike most LATAM countries.
25   
The Caballero et. al. (2004) reading of the contrast between Chile and Australia is 
consistent with the Debt Intolerance view.  It is also consistent with the view that the key to debt 
intolerance is deeper structural factors, including polarization, distribution of income, and 
political instability.  More generally, debt intolerance may be related to the ability of the social 
contract to deal with shocks.  History impacts the investors’ priors about these concerns.  All the 
above may explain the root sources of emerging markets vulnerability, as has been articulated in 
past contributions.
26   
 
                                                 
25 The latest WDI reveals that the Real GDP per capita growth rate of Chile was double that of Australia during 
1986-2003 [0.04 versus 0.02].  This provides more evidence that, while Original Sin plays a role, it is not the major 
obstacle to growth.   
26 See Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Rodrik (1999).   22
4.   Concluding remarks 
We close the reassessment of the financial liberalizations in LATAM in the 1990s with 
an overview of qualifications and open issues.  The skeptical view regarding the beneficial role 
of external financing in propagating long run growth does not imply that external financing does 
not play a role in helping a take-off.  Korea provides a good example where the large aid 
following the Korea war supplemented domestic policies, helping in engineering the impressive 
take-off.
27  Yet, the degree to which the Korean example is relevant to other take-offs is 
debatable.  First, aid may be essential in dealing with the aftermath of a major war, like Korea in 
the 1960s, or the Marshal plan following the 2
nd World War; but it may matter less [or even 
hinder development] in more normal circumstances.  As the experience of China, Chile and India 
in the 1990s illustrated, take-offs may occur without relying on external funding.  More research 
along the lines of Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) is needed to provide further insight 
about the issues at hand. 
The skeptical view regarding external financing advanced in this paper does not imply 
that policies inhibiting financial openings are beneficial.  The strongest argument for financial 
opening may be the pragmatic one. Like it or not, greater trade integration erodes the 
effectiveness of restrictions on capital mobility.  Indeed, de-facto financial openness (measured 
by the sum of gross private capital inflows and outflows as percent of GDP) depends positively 
on lagged trade openness, controlling for macroeconomic and political economy factors.
28  
Hence, for successful emerging markets that engage in trade integration, financial opening is not 
a question of if, but of when and how -- a country that undergoes rapid commercial integration 
will find it impractical to enforce rigid financial repression. This result is consistent with the 
view that sequencing of reforms is important, and that the timing of financial reforms should 
depend on trade openness factors, as well as on the soundness of the macro economic policies. 
                                                 
27 Interestingly, the role of foreign aid in Korean development fizzled by 1970.  Korea’s saving and investment rates 
followed the prediction of the habit formation approach: both gross national saving and investment more than tripled 
from 1960s to the 1980s; the Korean self-financing ratio reached 1 in the mid 1980s [see Noland (2004) for an 
insightful case study of Korean economic history]. 
28 Aizenman and Noy (2004) studied the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness.  The data 
suggest almost a symmetric two-way feedback between (lagged) financial and trade openness. 
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